

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.

244-3540

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM National Press Club Luncheon STATION WETA-FM Radio
NPR Network

DATE October 25, 1978 1:00 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Admiral Stansfield Turner

BILL BUSENBERG: From Washington, D.C., National Public Radio presents another program in our continuing series of broadcasts from the National Press Club. I'm Bill Busenberg, and today's guest speaker is Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

And now here is the President of the National Press Club to introduce guests at the head table and today's speaker.

FRANK AUKOFER: Good afternoon. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the National Press Club. I'm Frank Aukofer of the Milwaukee Journal, the President of the Press Club.

I'd also like to welcome, in addition to the people in the ballroom here today, our radio audience. The National Press Club's luncheon speeches go out to more than 200 stations of the National Public Radio network.

I'd like to remind people here in the audience today that you have an opportunity to ask questions of our speaker today....

[Head table introduced]

AUKOFER: When our guest speaker took over as Director of Central Intelligence in March of 1977, after a distinguished career in the Navy, not many people at the CIA Headquarters in Langley knew him. As most of you probably know, they don't wear uniforms or insignia out there at the CIA. They tend to operate incognito. So to solve the problem of recognition of the new chief, they got him a tee-shirt. Printed on it are the words

OFFICES IN: NEW YORK • LOS ANGELES • CHICAGO • DETROIT • AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES

Material supplied by Radio TV Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.

"Super Spook." To make certain nobody ever made a mistake, they also got one for Mrs. Turner. It says "Mrs. Super Spook." And to be absolutely certain that the chief himself never forgot who he was or where he was, there is a "Super Spook" sign on his bathroom door.

Like many of his predecessors at the CIA, Admiral Turner is a military man. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, has a master's degree from Oxford University, which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar, and has held various commands in the Navy, including Commander of the Second Fleet and the NATO Striking Fleet.

But when President Carter picked him as the nation's top spy, he had not been an intelligence man. In a sense, he followed in the footsteps of his son Jeff, who is an intelligence officer in the Navy.

In the Navy, they refer to intelligence personnel as "bean counters." So you might say that Admiral Turner now has become the chief "bean counter."

In his career, both in the Navy and as head of Central Intelligence, Admiral Turner's taken actions of particular interest to journalists. As President of the Naval War College, he started conferences to bring journalists together with young military officers. Having attended one conference myself, I can testify that they do much to erase stereotypes in both groups.

As head of Central Intelligence, Admiral Turner has opened up a public affairs office which routinely issues CIA studies, often at the rate of three a week.

The CIA, of course, sometimes has problems similar to those of journalists: they don't divulge their sources.

After he took over at the CIA, Admiral Turner took a speed-reading course, which has enabled him to read every intelligence report every day.

[Laughter]

AUKOFER: I imagine there are a few juicy ones in there, but...

Co-workers say he has almost total recall, and once spotted the fact that a report misspelled the name of a U.S. diplomat in Somalia.

When he's not running the nation's intelligence apparatus, Admiral Turner is an avid tennis player, who often plays

with FBI Director William Webster, who's sitting right here. Now, can you imagine that? The CIA Director against the FBI Director. They must have all sorts of James Bond ways of beating each other.

As many of you probably know, President Carter and Admiral Turner were classmates at the Naval Academy, and Admiral Turner, as the top military man in the class, the Commander of the Brigade, was the future President's commanding officer.

Since taking over as head of the CIA, we have learned -- we won't divulge our sources -- that there has been a major change in the relationship between the President and Admiral Turner. Admiral Turner no longer requires Mr. Carter to salute him.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner.

[Applause]

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Thank you very much, Frank.

Ladies and gentlemen, I always regret when somebody like Frank, being generous in introducing me, discloses the fact that I got my present assignment strictly on the merits of my abilities, not because I was a classmate of the President of the United States.

In the 19 months since the President appointed me as Director of Central Intelligence, I have fallen into a daily habit of starting my day by reading your press clips. I do so almost holding my breath, however, waiting to see what new disclosure is going to uncover one or another of our intelligence sources. Sometimes it's a simple leak, sometimes it's one of our officers who had to testify in a court, sometimes it's a subpoena for one of our documents or some of our notes.

As a result, unfortunately, with this kind of a start to my day, I've almost come to look on you people as our adversaries. That is, at least until recently, when I began to perceive that, in reading the press, it was almost as likely to be you who were being hauled into court to defend your right for secrecy, or it was you who were being served these subpoenas for your notes or your documents.

Why, this morning, look at the Washington Post. In this column there's the story of the problem I have today with disclosing documents for the prosecution of ITT. In this column there's the story of the problem you had yesterday with disclosing the notes of Mr. Farber in the prosecution he was involved in.

I can say to you: Welcome to the club. I'm glad to...

[Applause]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm glad to share this problem with you.

At least if I understand the essence of the problem that the court cases of Farber and the Stanford Daily and others have raised, it's whether preserving the confidentiality of a newsman's sources is essential for him to fulfill his obligations and to continue the success of his profession.

Now, if this is a problem for you, let me assure you that the problem of keeping secrets, of being able to preserve the anonymity of our sources is the number one problem of your United States intelligence community today.

The focus of the media with respect to intelligence, for almost four years now, has been almost exclusively on the abuses of the past. I can assure you that in my opinion the probability of the excesses of intelligence today is less than it has ever been in our history. If there is a threat or a danger today, it is our inability to carry out necessary intelligence operations because of the threat of disclosure.

Let me give you a few examples of why I say this.

First, Allied intelligence services are very nervous about whether we can keep secrets. I suspect that some of them are withholding information from us. I know that just recently a foreign intelligence service declined a joint covert action with us that would have been of great benefit to both countries. It did so when reminded that I must notify eight committees of the Congress of any covert action. They simply did not believe we could keep that secret.

Beyond that, agents who work for us, for the good of our country, even though they are not citizens of it, are beginning to ask, "When will my name appear in your press?"

This is not a transient, short-term problem; it is one that could have an impact on our intelligence capabilities for a decade or more. In this kind of a climate, you simply don't get people to volunteer to be agents for the United States.

Finally, with respect to this question of the dangers of leaks on our operations, let me point out that there is a danger that too many leaks will lead to intelligence-by-timidity. The timid reporter never gets the big story. The timid intelligence operative does not take those risks which must be taken if he's to do his job, especially if he, in his conscience,

fears that the sources he is working with are ultimately going to be disclosed.

Now, all three of these examples are part of the same fundamental problem of preserving sources and their confidentiality, a problem which you face as well as we. I don't know what your profession is doing today to confront this problem and to change the ways in which you do business, but I would like to describe to you some of the things that we are doing.

First of all, we recognize that much of the problem lies on our doorstep. It is sometimes our own people who leak, or are former employees; and it is our responsibility to defend ourselves against deliberate espionage. And so today we are tightening our security procedures. This is always difficult. You can tighten security procedures at any time, but you can tighten them so much that you can't get your job done. On the other hand, you can be so interested in efficiency that you don't protect what needs to be protected.

Today, I believe the tables have tilted just a bit too much on the side of efficiency rather than on the side of secrecy. I am tilting them back, and in the process I sincerely hope I'm going to make it much more difficult for you to get our secrets.

We're also doing things externally. We have a policy, that Frank referred to, of greater openness. My being here with you today is an indication of my commitment to keep the American public as well informed about intelligence activities as we possibly can.

How does openness help us preserve secrets? Well, one of the greatest problems of maintaining secrecy today is that there is too much information that is classified. There is a lack of respect for the classified label, simply because there is too much of it. And so by reducing that corpus of classified information, through releasing to the public what we can, I hope to engender greater respect for that which must remain secret.

It takes more than openness, however, to preserve secrecy. Basically, there must, in my view, be a renewed acknowledgement, both with you in the media and the public in general, of the legitimacy of having secrets. Now, this is a very fine line, as we all know, a fine line between so much secrecy that you impede justice and you stanch the free flow of information in our open society; or, on the other hand, releasing so much that you endanger vital national interests. There must be some balance between a government that serves its people poorly because it does not keep them well informed and a government that serves its people poorly because it discloses things that must not be disclosed.

No government, no business, no newspaper, no individual can afford to live in total openness. Newsmen feel that the release of their notes, even in a charge of murder, would set a precedent and would endanger obligations that they had undertaken. So, too, do we in the field of intelligence face this kind of difficult decision on a daily basis.

There is one difference, however, on how we confront these obligations. Your case for maintaining the privacy of your sources rests on your interpretation of the Constitution, an interpretation which is being challenged today. My case rests on a law, the National Security Act of 1947, which expressly charges the person of the Director of Central Intelligence with being responsible for protecting our sources and methods of collecting intelligence from unauthorized disclosure. I simply must comply with this law, to the best of my ability and conscience.

There is still one other difference between my problems of secrecy and yours, and this is that protecting sources is only one part of my problem.

Now, it has become quite out of vogue to talk about withholding information in the name of national security. But because that principle has been abused in the past, it is not less valid today. Quite simply, there is information which it is not in the national interest to disclose.

We cannot negotiate a SALT treaty if our positions are known in advance. We cannot afford, as a country, to develop expensive weapon systems or devices for collecting intelligence, and then reveal their precise details to others.

Because, however, we in the world of intelligence are in the risk-taking business and because there is a genuine potential for abuse in the procedures we must apply, it is important that there be special checks on us and our procedures.

I believe today that we have those checks and that they give the American public a greater assurance than ever before against any reoccurrence of abuse.

Out of the crucible of the last almost-four years of intense public criticism we have forged a series of controls and oversight procedures that give us that assurance.

To begin with, there is the policy of greater openness, which I have cited to you. Beyond this, we have a series of mechanisms to check on our day-to-day procedures. First, there are general guidelines which provide the framework in which all intelligence officers now operate. The first general guideline is that espionage must be regarded as an extraordinary

activity. We must not, by spying try to obtain information that can be found and made available through open sources.

The second guideline is that we must be able, in principle, to defend in public that which we do in secret. Clearly, we cannot disclose all the details of particular espionage activities. But we can explain that the types of activities we undertake are in fact in the national interest and in conformity with the attitudes and policies of our country.

Now, beyond these guidelines, we also have established a number of prohibitions. There are some activities, such as assassination, which are so repugnant to our national standards that we can flatly prohibit them.

In many cases, however, a total prohibition is being too rigid. And in these cases we have what we call injunctions, a general prohibition against undertaking such activity, but with specific exceptions. This is a commonly accepted procedure with law enforcement in our country. No one would expect Judge Webster of the FBI to search his home unless there was a judicial warrant issued making a special exception. Similarly, we now have established such procedures and checks, some of them involving warrants, some of them not.

For instance, there is a prohibition on using members of the American media as intelligence operatives, unless I personally make the exception.

Now, the most significant change, and one that is truly revolutionary, in our intelligence procedures today is the effective establishment of external oversight from both the Executive and the Legislative Branches. This oversight is intended to check on how well the guidelines, the prohibitions, the injunctions are being followed. It also is intended to insure that the overall tone of our intelligence activities is in line with the attitudes and the mores of our country.

First, there is an Intelligence Oversight Board, which has been in existence for a little over three years. This board consists of three men from outside the government, former Senator Gore, former Governor Scranton, and Mr. Thomas Farmer of this city. Their only responsibility is to look into the legality and the propriety of our intelligence activities. Anyone may report what they think are abuses to them. The committee investigates and reports only to the President.

Beyond this, we now have committees of the Congress, one in the Senate for over two years, one in the House for a little over a year, dedicated exclusively to intelligence oversight. The relationship between these select committees and the intelligence community is one of cooperation and helpfulness.

But at the same time, there is no question that it is a relationship of check and balance, of supervision and investigation. There is no question that we are accountable to these committees. And in this short time that the committees have been in existence, many in the intelligence community have come to recognize the positive values of congressional oversight for us.

Ultimate accountability is essential to responsible actions. When the stakes are high, when the risks are great, and when there's a spirit of patriotism involved, you need to have accountability to make your judicious selection of what you need to do. And that's what I think is happening through this intelligence oversight process. We are looking not only at the benefits, we are looking carefully at the risks of our intelligence programs.

The intelligence committees of the Congress are today engaged in developing new legislation, legislation which will codify the guidelines, the prohibitions, the injunctions, and these general oversight procedures. I strongly support this activity and these proposed charters, as they will be called, for our intelligence community. I support them, first, because they will provide the legal foundation behind what we do. Secondly, it will provide to the intelligence operator in the field, and to us in headquarters, an idea of what the scope of our activities can and should be, what we are permitted and not permitted to do, and what types of activities will be closely overseen by our various committees.

Now, on top of all of these governmental controls and checks, we also count on you, the media, as a oversight mechanism, a mechanism for helping to reassure the public and to prevent abuses. My plea to you today, however, is to recognize the similarity of our plights. We in intelligence are professionals dedicated to secrecy and constantly having to fend off demands for excessive openness. You are professionals dedicated to openness, and now constantly having to fend off demands to release your few secrets.

I hope that you will recognize that when we balk, for instance, at turning over documents necessary for prosecution in the courts, we do not do so in an arbitrary manner. We think these issues out very carefully. And we are most aware that we must not only justify our position to the Attorney General, but perhaps ultimately to our oversight committees.

Nonetheless, it is right for you to question the judgments that we make in these instances. But I would hope that you would recognize, in passing such judgment, that you are at the severe disadvantage of having only part of the story. You do not have the advantages of the Oversight Board and the Select Committees of access to our secrets, or at least I hope not.

This places you, indeed, in a difficult position. You have to be concerned at whether you may, with incomplete information, be misleading the public or releasing material that is injurious to our country. On the other hand, you surely have the obligation to keep our country informed and to check on malfeasance in the government.

You also have a delicate responsibility in judging the validity of the so-called whistle-blowers who frequently come to you with charges of impropriety or inefficiency. Many of these people appear to have altruistic motives, and I'm sure reassure you that what they are releasing is not truly sensitive or secret.

Parenthetically, I might add that it is a very delicate matter to determine what really is sensitive or secret, and not likely to be one that somebody was, at best, only third- or fourth-echelon and didn't have a view from which he could assess the entire equities is likely to be a good judge.

But the potential in these situations for abuse, for abuse of you and of your role in our society is very great. What better way to promote your new book than to persuade the media to start titillating the public by publishing excerpts of unauthorized revelations from it?

I would suggest that it is the rare whistle-blower who resorts to the oversight mechanisms I have described to report undue secrecy or improper activities and report them in a channel where secrets can be kept. Instead, I find none who have done that fully, but, rather, they have turned to the court of last resort, you, the public press. This, I'm afraid, makes me suspicious of their motivations. I suggest it should you, also.

Further, let me just suggest that when ever elected or appointed public official today is automatically suspect, and every renegade whistle-blower is automatically a hero, and when we have more emphasis on criticizing and tearing down our society than on building it up, I think, as a nation, we are headed for trouble.

Still, I do not envy you the difficult job of conducting oversight and assessing the validity of whistle-blowers and other sources without full access to all of the information which you really need. You face very difficult choices in steering a course between the Scylla of undue criticism and the Charybdis of taking too much on face value, and in making that difficult of choice of whether, in the national interest, it is better to print a secret or to withhold it.

What I do not accept, however, is the thesis that is sometimes proffered that your responsibilities are such that you must print everything you learn; or the thesis that because

someone else is going to print it anyway, the question is moot; or the thesis that if you have the information, surely the KGB or other intelligence services have it also.

But let me add, I'm not suggesting that we in government who are responsible for keeping secrets are the ones to pass judgment on your choices in these matters. It is our public that should and will pass that judgment.

I would suggest that the recent court decisions on Farber and others may well indicate that neither the public nor the courts agree with some of the premises under which you have traditionally operated. Your unfettered right to print and to disclose is being seriously questioned today, as was our unfettered right to classify.

Accordingly, as I see the situation, we both are in the midst of a reassessment of where our roles in this society are and how we go about fulfilling them. I would suggest that we in the intelligence community have been about this reassessment for several years now. There is something to be learned, I believe, from that. I would not suggest, however, how you ought to resolve the issues of how you play your role in our society.

From my point of view, though, as this country's chief intelligence officer, what I expect from the nation's media is a greater understanding of the commonality of our problem of protecting sources; less suspicion and reliance on inferences rather than facts, especially with respect to alleged improprieties; fewer headlines about what happened 25 years ago, playing it as though it were yesterday; and more emphasis on our concerns for today and tomorrow; and more discretion at what is truly relevant to our society's needs, as opposed to being just sensation.

Let me acknowledge again, though, that I recognize it is by no means easy for you to draw these lines precisely when you have only partial information.

In the final analysis, we both serve the same master and will be judged by the same jury: the public of the United States.

Within the framework of our uneasy relationship, I believe that there is room for a mutual respect and for us to work closer together rather than farther apart. A greater degree of communication, and even trust, will benefit both of us and will also permit us jointly to serve the American people more effectively. I hope we can do that.

Thank you.

[Applause]

AUKOFER: Almost makes some of us want to sign up.

[Laughter]

AUKOFER: ...The first questioner alludes to your reference to keeping secrets in court cases, and notes that two federal court cases were stopped yesterday because of secret information, would like to know what the CIA's policy is on criminal trials that involve national security interests when keeping those secrets may mean that people like ITT executives can't be prosecuted.

ADMIRAL TURNER: My policy is that I bear a legal responsibility to advise the Attorney General if the release of documents or testimony necessary for prosecution will in my opinion endanger the national interest. Clearly, this is a subjective judgment in each opinion. And in each case I try to provide my view on how serious the damage would be. I do not claim the privilege of withholding anything from the courts. I claim the privilege only of insuring that those who make the release have had the opportunity to balance the benefits of prosecution with the benefits -- or the detriments, rather, of revelation. And I see nothing different in that than in claiming privilege for Mr. Farber's notes in a case of murder trials.

[Applause]

AUKOFER: This question relates to classification, in that you mentioned overclassification. The questioner would like to know, is it safe for an individual to overclassify rather than to underclassify, sort of to save his own neck? And how important is this problem?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, it's safer to overclassify than underclassify.

To tell you a sea story. A few years ago I had what I thought was a brilliant idea. I forwarded it through channels for how the Navy could do something of great importance. When I looked at it I said, "You know, that really, really isn't classified." So I sent it forward in unclassified channels. A couple of days later, it appeared in the Norfolk newspapers, and the next day the Washington newspapers had 17 congressmen complaining about this horrendous idea, which I believed was great and could have been sold to them if it had come through the proper channels. But because I couldn't hold anybody accountable for this unclassified piece, I got burned by underclassifying.

But it is a serious problem. The new presidential directive on classification puts strictures against over classification. It's something that is endemic, it's something that we have to each work at each day, and it just takes repeated effort and emphasis.

As recently as two hours ago, I wrote a note to one of my subordinates, who had written me and said, "We shouldn't declassify this. There's not enough pressure on us."

I said, "That is not the policy. The question is, is it reasonably declassified without hurting the national interest? If it is, let's go."

AUKOFER: We have several questions about wiretapping. And, somehow, I don't expect much of an answer, but...

[Laughter]

AUKOFER: How many -- there are two: Are you now or have you wiretapped any law firms in this country? And how many taps, if any, does the CIA have in operation in news bureaus, outside and inside this country?

ADMIRAL TURNER: At the risk of destroying my friendship with a friend who destroys me on the tennis courts regularly, I have to say that any wiretaps in this country are out of my province.

[Applause]

13

ADMIRAL TURNER: And if I knew, I wouldn't tell you the answer to those questions either.

[Laughter]

AUKOFER: That's kind of what I figured.

This questioner asks: Could you please comment on the short-range benefits of the restoration of American bases and communication centers in Turkey?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I'd like to expand on that question, because my last military assignment was commander of the southern flank of NATO, including Turkey; and I think the long-term benefits of this restoration of better relations between our countries is very, very important to us, as well as to Turkey and to NATO. Turkey is that eastern anchor of the NATO alliance, a most stalwart country in defense of freedom and a country in a geographical location of tremendous importance.

In the short term, there is no question that the return to operation of our intelligence-collection bases in Turkey is very valuable to us. In the years that we did not have those facilities, we were able to route around and otherwise get some of the information from other sources. You never can completely replace something as valuable as those Turkish bases, and so we had a very definite net loss. And the routing around is a Peter-and-Paul situation, where, yes, you may pick up something that used to be done in Turkey by some other means, but you probably then lose something else that you were doing; the priorities just have to shift down.

I can't quantify it for you, but I'm very, very happy that this turn of events has taken place.

AUKOFER: We have a number of questions on Nicholas George Shadrin (?), the Soviet defector who disappeared in Vienna while on a CIA mission. One questioner asks: Can you give us any assurance that he is not now in CIA custody? Another questioner would like to know if he is alive and living in Australia.

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, he is not in CIA custody. I do not know if he is alive. I do not know if he is in Australia. I have put a good amount of time onto the Shadrin case in my brief tenure in this job, and I find no evidence of foul play on the part of any American authorities, nor do I have any conclusive evidence or good clues as to just where Shadrin is. I wish I did.

AUKOFER: Now that we've opened the Australia connection, the questioner says: In 1977 the Senate Select Com-

mittee on Intelligence asked the CIA for a report on its activities in Australia. Will this report ever be made public? Can you give us an assurance that the CIA is not involved in activities designed to influence Australian politics and organized labor activities?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I hope the report will not be made public because I think there is classified information in it. It is up to the Congress to decide whether their reports are released.

Yes, I can give total assurance we are not in any way trying to influence internal Australian labor or other activities.

AUKOFER: In that connection, what is the justification, as a general matter, for interference in the internal political affairs in other countries?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, now we are getting into the murky waters of covert political action, as opposed to intelligence. Intelligence is the collecting of information and its evaluation. Covert political action is the effort to influence events in foreign countries without the influencer being known. Political action is not an intelligence activity, but, since 1947, whenever this country has authorized political action, it has been assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency to carry out.

I would say to you that, in my view, there is less need and usefulness for covert political action today than there was at times in the past, at times when it has been very successful on behalf of our country.

There are times, like when you want to frustrate a terrorist group, that it is useful to be able to infiltrate somebody into it and get them to influence the course of events in that group, where if they knew it was the United States doing that, it would be use -- it would be meaningless, it wouldn't be useful at all.

And so let's not kid ourselves. All of our diplomacy, all of our economic power and pressure, all of our military threat is here to influence other countries, to make sure they don't do things inimical to us. Covert political action is another tool in that quiver of arrows.

As I say, it is less useful and applicable today, and particularly, as I mentioned in my prepared remarks, because of the danger of exposure of it. But it is something that I sincerely believe we must retain the full panoply of potential for. One does not know what 1985 or 1990 may bring.

[Applause]

AUKOFER: In that connection, do you anticipate a continuing shift to greater reliance upon electronic intelligence?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes and no. Over the past decade and a half, the capabilities of electronic and photographic reconnaissance techniques have expanded remarkably. This is part of the great strength of our country, in its marvelous technical expertise and its ability to translate that expertise into practical application. So today we are almost surfeited with information derived from what we call these technical intelligence-collection sources, and they become more capable at all times.

But when you look at this situation in its broad aspects, you must appreciate that, as a generalization, what you obtain from a photograph or a signals-intercept generally tells you about something that happened some time in the past. And as soon as I tell this to a policymaker, he looks me in the eye and says, "Stan, why did it happen, and what's going to happen next?" And there is where the human intelligence activity comes in. It is the forte of the spy to divine, to find, to learn what other people's intentions, attitudes, plans, policies are.

And so, my view is, yes, electronic intelligence is increasing, because the technical capabilities are continuing to increase; but, no, it is not relatively more important, because as you gain more technical information, you must have more human information to complement it.

And, therefore, our emphasis is to have a balanced approach in this. And within last year, I have requested and the President has directed the establishment, under Lieutenant General Frank Kamm (?), who was introduced to you here, something called a National Intelligence Tasking Center. And by that I mean tasking technical intelligence, human intelligence, and making it work as a team.

That is what is different today. We have increased emphasis on the importance of bringing together, in teamwork, all of the collection elements, be they technical or human.

AUKOFER: Occasionally we get a question that's based on something I haven't heard about, but that's not important. The questioner would like to know whether there's any truth to the report that Soviet leader Brezhnev died in January and a lookalike is substituting for him.

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: If he has, he's fooled me.

AUKOFER: This questioner would like to know whether the CIA is looking for violations of the arms embargo to South Africa, and, if so, whether it's found any.

ADMIRAL TURNER: Surely it is our responsibility to understand the military posture of countries around the world that are of concern to us, and that would include trying to understand what the South Africans' capability is to obtain and manufacture and handle their weapon systems. But I am not in the business of policing the laws of this country and determining if Firm X or Y is avoiding a legal sanction against sending arms to South Africa. That's over in the law enforcement department.

AUKOFER: This questioner would like to know how the intelligence community will be able to demonstrate to the American public and the Congress that it can reliably verify the provisions of the pending SALT II treaty.

ADMIRAL TURNER: This is one of our great challenges in the months ahead, if a treaty is signed soon. And I'll be frank with you. I doubt that I will be able to make a persuasive explanation of the degree to which we can verify in the public forum, for the reasons we've been discussing so much today. But I am confident that I can give a succinct, clear statement of what those capabilities are and what they are not to the Congress.

And I would also like to give you this assurance: that as the SALT negotiations have proceeded, each term, each proposal made by the Soviets or made by ourselves has come to us in the intelligence community for scrutiny. And for each one, I have gone back and said, "This is the potential for verification that we see, with our intelligence sources. This is how we think that capability may increase or decrease over the years ahead. And therefore, in a sense, this is the risk you are taking if you accept this provision. And here are some suggestions for how you might write that differently that would help us better verify it."

So I can assure you I am convinced that those who make the decisions on what we should offer and what we should accept are well possessed of the information that I have, in its greatest detail, about how well we could verify those provisions.

AUKOFER: An equal opportunity question. The questioner would like to know, are there many female citizens in the United States acting as spies? And would you recommend spying as a good profession for women?

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Definitely.

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: In fact, I must admit to the ladies that we have been remiss in the Central Intelligence Agency in getting enough women into the clandestine side of our business. And therefore there is greater opportunity for them, proportionally, than for males, because we are anxious to redress that shortcoming.

There are a few instances in which being in the clandestine business as a lady is not satisfactory. There are some countries where you just can't walk out on the street, as a lady, and not be noticed as being unusual, because of their culture and their society.

But there are, in my opinion, as many other instances in which a lady might be even preferable to a man in doing the kind of clandestine work that we have to do.

So the opportunities are there. We are stressing it in our recruiting. We are getting wonderful applicants from young ladies in our country, and we're just anxious for any more. And if whoever wrote the question will send me an address, we'll get you a recruiter out there right away.

[Laughter]

AUKOFER: This questioner refers to President Carter's austerity program, announced yesterday, about reduction of federal employees; wants to know whether this will affect your operating capacity and will we get a subpar intelligence program because of this, and do you propose to request relief from President Carter's edict?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't believe, at this time, it will. But I must confess to you that we have to wait and get the interpretations, the exact rulings from the Office of Management and Budget, in particular, as to how the President's directive is to be carried out. But at this point, in the clandestine service we have just been talking about, we are overstrength to where we expect to be at the end of this fiscal year.

You will recall that, with some controversy, a year ago next week I ordered a 820-position reduction in our clandestine service. We're still in the process of executing that. So we have some slack here. If the employment levels go down, it won't hurt us.

Let me explain to you too, in response to the pre -- in connection with the previous question about balance between elec-

tronic and human intelligence collection, that this 820 reduction was by no means indicated -- or, intended to reflect a change of emphasis. It was simply a recognition of a very long-standing fact: that we were overstaffed; and that, to me, was very inimical to the long-term interests of our country and of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We have outstanding young people who have come in, even during the intensity of criticism of the CIA. And if I am going to challenge them and inspire them to stay in this organization and be the backbone of it in 10, 15, 20 years, we must challenge them today with a full and meaningful job. And if we're overstaffed and they are underutilized and oversupervised, we'll never make it.

AUKOFER: We have several questions on the Freedom of Information Act: How does it affect the operations of the CIA? Do you see any prospect of repealing the Freedom of Information Act, and would you like to?

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I would not like to. I think the Freedom of Information Act has provided a very valuable service to our country. It consumes, however, over 100 man-years of Central Intelligence employee time, and much, much of that is wasted. We have so few requests that we can fulfill, with respect to the number that come in, because of the classification point of view, that we spin our wheels having to be conscientious and review document after document, and turning them down.

We hope there will be some relief in the Congress from the procedures which are required here.

We have -- Jack Blake, our Assistant -- Deputy Director for Administration is sitting down here.

Jack, how many man-years did we consume with just fulfilling Mr. Agee's requests alone?

JACK BLAKE: About nine man-years so far, sir.

ADMIRAL TURNER: We've consumed nine man-years just responding to one American -- I hate to call him an American -- citizen's request, one person.

And every time we issue anything or we have anything appear in the press, we get requests from certain organizations in this town, one after the other; and we have to go through these in infinite detail.

It just is an unreasonable situation and cost to the taxpayer today. And I think it can be mitigated by some modification. But I think the basic principal of giving the public

access to things that need not be classified is a very good one.

AUKOFER: Admiral Turner, we thank you very much for appearing here today, and we have for your our National Press Club certificate of appreciation and a National Press Club tie.

And I have one final question for you, asked of you in your dual capacity of Director of Central Intelligence and as a former football player for the U.S. Naval Academy. The Washington Redskins won their first game, it was said, because they had a game plan report from the other team. Now that they've lost two in a row, what can the CIA do to help them get game plans in the future?

[Laughter and applause]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I'd like to help the Redskins in the worst way, but the only thing I can do is to quote my football mentor, the man who meant a great deal to me in my life, who's sitting right in front of me here, E.E. "Rip" Miller of the Naval Academy coaching staff. And I still remember the day when after three tries from our six-inch line Notre Dame failed to cross the goal line, the whistle blew and the game ended. We all went running into the locker room, jumping and shouting. And as we got in there Rip looked at us and said, "Gentlemen, long after those deeds have been forgotten, the score will be remembered. You tied."

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you.

[Applause]